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Abstract—Controlling the flow of sensitive data has been 
widely acknowledged as a critical aspect for securing web 
information systems. A common limitation of previous 
approaches for the implementation of the information flow 
control is their proposal of new scripting languages. This 
makes them infeasible to be applied to existing systems written 
in traditional programming languages as these systems need to 
be redeveloped in the proposed scripting language. This paper 
proposes a methodology that offers a common interlinqua 
through the use of Semantic Web technologies for securing 
web information systems independently of their programming 
language. 
Web vulnerabilities; Computer Security; Information flow; 
Semantic Web 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-crime is a major interdisciplinary concern thriving 
on the opportunities that information and communication 
technologies (ICT) offer [1]. Activities which fall under the 
cyber-crime category expand from the use of malware to 
gain sensitive information [2] to the use of technology in 
order to plan terrorist attacks [1]. In this research the authors 
focus on testing web applications for web vulnerabilities that 
can lead to cyber-attacks.  
Web applications constitute a major target for computer 
“hackers”. High profile companies, such as: NASA [3], Sony 
[4] and Citigroup Inc. [5], have suffered cyber-attacks that 
lead to these hackers gaining access to unauthorized data and 
other information (such as bank account and credit card 
details, contact information, email addresses) that could lead 
to identity theft [6]. According to security company McAfee, 
the last 5 years have seen the biggest series of cyber-attacks 
in history, including the infiltration of 72 world 
organizations as well as the United Nations [7]. 
These series of cyber-attacks are due to implementation 
flaws in the web applications’ underlying programming 
code. In practice, developers of applications that contain 
sensitive/hidden data will surround the implementation code 
with security features to protect the sensitive data. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to guarantee that a piece of 
complex software does not contain some flaws [8]. 
Developers make mistakes, which results in implementation 
bugs that can be exploited in order to gain access to 
unauthorized information. Local implementation errors, 
interprocedural errors or even malicious programmers trying 
to compromise the security of the network can cause security 
breaches [9]. 
A significant amount of research has been carried out in 
the area of finding vulnerabilities in web application systems 
that could expose confidential data by employing methods of 
information flow control [10]. Most of the proposed research 
methods use the decentralized label model (DLM) and apply 
it using a generalization of security classes (labels), security 
policies and rules describing how data can be consumed 
based on the security policy that describes the data. A 
common limitation of these systems is their proposal of new 
scripting languages. This makes it infeasible for the proposed 
methods to be applied to existing web applications or 
systems, as applications will need to be rewritten in the 
proposed programming language [11]. 
This research aims to develop a method modeling 
vulnerabilities in applications through information flow 
control. This approach will provide not only comparable 
reliability in terms of the number of vulnerabilities found, 
but also a method that does not require existing systems to be 
redeveloped. To evaluate the proposed method, it is 
compared against previous approaches; specifically the 
method will be evaluated in terms of number and type of 
vulnerabilities found. As previous approaches in the area of 
finding vulnerabilities in computer applications through 
information flow control are applied to web applications, the 
proposed method will target web applications and traditional 
scripting languages: PHP, Perl, and Python. 
The key aspect that differentiates the proposed method to 
previous approaches is that rather than proposing a new 
language, the proposed technique will be applicable to 
existing programs. This approach will be based on open 
standards and W3C recommendations, specifically Semantic 
Web technologies. Application code will be exported to the 
Resource Description Framework (RDF) format. A semantic 
reasoner will detect vulnerabilities by finding inconsistencies 
in the model, in conjunction with an ontology about the 
domain of information flow control of sensitive data and 
rules about how data can be consumed based on their 
labeling. The proposed method will statically check 
information flow within web information systems that 
contain sensitive data. 
As a definition, a web information system consists of one 
or more web applications. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In the introduction section it was shown that a viable 
approach to finding vulnerabilities in web information 
systems is through the information flow control. Controlling 
the flow of sensitive data has been acknowledged as a critical 
aspect of securing applications, even at industry level [12]. 
This section reviews and explains language-based 
information flow control systems and their limitations in 
terms of applicability. 
A. Language-based Information Flow Control 
1) Ad-hoc mechanisms. 
Taint mode checking is a feature of some scripting 
languages, such as Perl and Ruby, used to detect 
vulnerabilities in applications [13]. Such mechanism treats 
all input data coming from outside the application and used 
in potentially dangerous operations, such as writing to a file 
or make system calls, as tainted values. Safe operations, such 
as print [14] are ignored by taint mode. Malicious users of 
web applications can exploit security weaknesses by using 
HTML web forms to input data that will cause the 
application to behave in an unexpected way. This can lead to 
access of confidential data. Best practice is to use bind 
variables by employing prepare and execute statements [15]. 
In Ruby, there are five safety levels, given by the value 
of $SAFE variable, which provides much finer control over 
the security checks of the code [16]. The safety levels range 
from level 0, where Ruby does not perform any checks, to 
level 4, where non-tainted objects cannot be modified. 
Not all scripting languages have a taint mode; Python and 
PHP are two examples. One advantage of taint mode is that 
for some languages, its implementation is straightforward. 
Perl uses an easy algorithm to run the security checks, but is 
known to contain bugs [11]. The disadvantage of current 
taint mode implementations is that they provide only an ad-
hoc mechanism for detecting vulnerabilities and are language 
dependent. For example, Perl’s taint mode cannot be applied 
to PHP code. 
2) Other scripting languages. 
Yip, Wang, Zeldovich and Kaashoek [17] introduced a 
new language runtime called RESIN that allows, through 
data annotations at code level, to find and prevent security 
vulnerabilities in web information systems. The proposed 
programming language introduces three mechanisms: policy 
objects, data tracking and filter objects. In order to control 
data flow, RESIN uses the policy objects to annotate and 
track sensitive data and then invokes the filter objects when 
data is written outside the program, such as when writing 
data to a file or the network. The authors explain how 
RESIN can prevent a series of vulnerabilities such as SQL 
injection, server-side script injection, password disclosure. 
Although RESIN is effective at finding most security 
vulnerabilities, the programmers are faced with extra 
overhead, as they are required to write extra code in order to 
implement the aforementioned data flow assertions. In terms 
of application overhead, RESIN adds a 33% CPU overhead 
when generating a page for a system like HotCRP. However, 
in their publication the authors did not mention the 
application overhead for web applications other than 
HotCRP. Furthermore, RESIN has a potential concern since 
the data flow assertion can be duplicated by data flow checks 
and security checks that already existed in an application. 
Myers [18] describes JFlow, a new language that extends 
the Java programming language developed to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data mostly using 
statically-checked data flow assertions. JFlow’s goal is to 
prevent sensitive information from being leaked through 
computation and it achieves this using decentralized label 
modeling (DLM). As opposed to other approaches for 
protecting confidential information that use dynamic security 
classes [19], JFlow uses static checking, allowing a detailed 
tracking of security classes without incurring run-time 
overhead. The author provides programmers with a JFlow 
compiler that will statically check programs written in 
JFlow. Furthermore, JFlow supports the development of 
secure applets and servers that handle sensitive data. 
Although JFlow addressed some of the limitations of 
previous proposed approaches, (e.g. mutable objects, 
subclassing, exceptions) programmers are required to write 
applications in the JFlow language. Therefore, this approach 
cannot be applied to traditional scripting languages such as 
PHP, Python or Perl, used in the development of web 
information systems. 
Li [20] proposes a new scripting language and a variable 
type checker in order to provide security and integrity of data 
in standard web applications systems that use query 
languages, such as SQL, to access the underlying database. 
The language interprets conventional security levels 
associated with data (e.g. public, secret, untainted, and 
tainted) according to downgrading policies, where every 
security level has a policy that specifies what computation is 
needed to downgrade data to that security level. The 
scripting language is similar to PHP and it uses the 
<?ssp_header and !ssp_header> delimiters for the 
programming code. The major difference be-tween PHP and 
the proposed language is that the queries to the web 
application’s database are strongly typed, therefore checking 
the code for confidentiality and integrity purposes is easier 
for programmers and the security checker used by the author 
can automatically determine if the code satisfies the security 
policies. However, similar to other approaches [18] [21] the 
author proposes a new scripting language thus, making it 
difficult for programmers that use standard web application 
development languages (such as PHP, Perl, Python) to 
employ this method. 
B. Enforcing Security and Privacy Policies Using 
Semantic Web Reasoning 
In this section, an example of a framework [22] that uses 
Semantic Web reasoning for enforcing context-sensitive 
security and privacy policies is given. Although this 
framework is applied in the context of a particular type of 
Policy Enforcing Agent (PEA), specifically an Information 
Disclosure Agent (IDA), it is important to note the 
methodology used, as conceptually this could be applied in 
the context of information flow control. 
The authors apply their proposed framework to an 
application scenario where there is a need for enforcing 
confidentiality and integrity policies in decentralized 
computing environments [22]. In such a scenario, a person 
who owns information sources (sensor, user, application etc.) 
invokes an IDA in order to disclose information ac-cording 
to pre-defined rules. An IDA receives a request for 
information. The IDA satisfies that request with information 
that the privacy and security policies allow to disclose. For 
example, an employee of a company wants to know the 
location of an-other employee. The employee uses the 
framework to send a request for the location information. 
The IDA of the other employee receives the incoming 
request, but answers the request based on the privacy and 
security policies that are associated with that information. 
The IDA could respond only with the building location and 
not the actual level in the building where the employee is 
located. 
The authors use RDF, rules and ontologies to describe 
the data, the policies and the domain knowledge, 
respectively. ROWL, an extension of OWL, is the 
specification used for expressing the concepts’ security and 
privacy policies [23].  
In this section, it was shown that reasoning with rules and 
ontologies in order to enforce security and privacy policies 
was previously proposed in literature. As part of the 
evaluation of the proposed Semantic Web framework, the 
authors implemented an example that used 22 rules and 178 
facts and that invoked a semantic service directory 
containing 50 services. Although this framework works in 
different contexts than the information flow control, it was 
shown that it is practical to enforce security policies using 
Semantic Web technologies by reasoning with rules and 
ontologies. 
III. OVERALL METHODOLOGY AND ARCHITECTURE 
The limitation of rewriting existing code to account for 
information flow constraints was previously mentioned by 
Zdancewic [11]. He recommends a mostly static approach, 
such that software is analyzed in order to check if policies 
applied to data are obeyed. In light of this, this paper 
proposes a methodology that addresses the limitation of 
previous approaches for securing web applications. 
Specifically, the proposed methodology leverages Semantic 
Web technologies in the field of information flow control to 
develop a tool deployable for existing web information 
systems, without the need for their code to be rewritten in a 
proposed programming language. 
Fig. 1 shows the overall architecture of the proposed 
methodology. The inputs consist of web information systems 
written in different programming languages. The 
programming code together with the respective language 
grammar is fed into an AST builder tool, such as ANTLR, 
and converted to RDF. 
Information flow control rules previously described in 
literature are expressed in RDF. There is a vast amount of 
work regarding the definition of rules for security policy 
enforcement [10]. This paper’s methodology reuses existing 
label-checking rule definitions. The inference engine is 
implemented using the Jena framework inference machinery. 
The Jena framework constitutes the programming toolkit for 
the methodology described in this paper. Jena was chosen as 
it is the most widespread Semantic Web framework [24]. 
While there are other frameworks, it falls out of the scope of 
this research to analyze which framework is the most 
productive or usable. 
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Figure 1. Overall architecture
Using Jena’s ModelFactory class a new inference 
model is created by associating a data set with some 
reasoner. The new model can be queried for statements. 
When the model is queried for data, statements that 
originally existed in the data set will be returned together 
with statements that were not in the original dataset. The new 
statements are inferred by the semantic reasoner using the 
defined rules or by other inference mechanisms. Reasoning 
is achieved using rules and ontologies in the context of 
information flow control over the programming code 
translated to RDF. The inferred statements will represent 
web vulnerabilities found in the web information systems 
given as input. 
IV. EXAMPLE SCENARIO 
As aforementioned in section III, the information flow 
control rules are translated from literature using Semantic 
Web technologies. The base for the creation of the ontology, 
the rules and the reasoning is JFlow [18]. First, JFlow is the 
first practical approach to a language-based information flow 
control system [18]; and second, this proposed language 
represented the base for several other proposed approaches: 
[25], [26]  and many more. 
JFlow uses a label model in which the label of some data 
consists of a set of policies and according to these defined 
policies the movement of the data is restricted. 
In this section a simple PHP example that leaks 
information will be given. The code will be converted to 
RDF using the JFlow label model. The rule that assures no 
leakage of information will be expressed using the Jena 
framework. The following code shows the PHP code. The 
conversion to RDF follows. 
 
<?php  
$b = True; //secret value  
// set of instructions that may 
change the value of b  
$x = 0; //public value  
if ($b) {  
$x = 1;  
}  
?> 
Code fragment 1. PHP code that leaks information. 
 
In this example, $b is a secret value and $x is a public 
value. The assignment $x = 1 leaks information, because 
if the assignment takes place the value of $x changes and 
thus, the conclusion that $b is True can be drawn, which 
gives out publicly the value of $b. These public and private 
variables can be expressed using RDF. These variables will 
have a label with a policy attached to it that will express their 
state: public or private.  
The information leak rule states that: 
“Any assignment where the pc counter has a private 
policy and it is assigned to a public variable is an 
information leak.”  
The pc counter concept is explained in [18]. JFlow 
associates the pc counter with every assignment and 
expression. 
 
 
<rdf:RDF 
... 
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://flowcontrol.org/1#assignment"> 
<fc:id>1</fc:id> 
<fc:variable_value>True</fc:variable_value> 
<fc:variable_name>b</fc:variable_name> 
<fc:hasPolicy>private</fc:hasPolicy> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://flowcontrol.org/Assignment"/> 
</rdf:Description> 
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://flowcontrol.org/2#assignment"> 
<fc:id>2</fc:id> 
<fc:variable_value>0</fc:variable_value> 
<fc:variable_name>x</fc:variable_name> 
<fc:hasPolicy>public</fc:hasPolicy> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://flowcontrol.org/Assignment"/> 
</rdf:Description> 
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://flowcontrol.org/3#assignment"> 
<fc:id>3</fc:id> 
<fc:variable_value>1</fc:variable_value> 
<fc:variable_name>x</fc:variable_name> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://flowcontrol.org/Assignment"/> 
</rdf:Description> 
... 
</rdf:RDF> 
Code fragment 2. Translation to RDF using the JFlow label model. 
The information that can be leaked after the execution of 
the statement will be assigned to the pc counter. In the PHP 
code example, at the $x = 1 assignment the pc counter will 
have the value b. Because x is public and b is private, the 
assignment represents an information leak. The rule that 
states that the assignment is an information leak in this case, 
is expressed using Jena rule syntax and is listed as follows.  
 
//defining namespaces  
@prefix fc: http://flowcontrol.org/  
[informationLeak: (?d rdf:type  
fc:InformationLeak)  
<-  
(?d rdf:type fc:Assigment)  
(?d fc:pc_counter ?pc)  
(?d fc:variable_name ?x)  
(?pc fc:hasPolicy “private”)  
(?x fc:hasPolicy “public”)] 
 
Code fragment 3. Information leak rule expressed using Jena rules syntax 
 
This example scenario section showed through an 
information leak example, how an approach using a 
proposed programming language to annotate data and detect 
an information leak can be translated using Semantic Web 
technologies. As mentioned in section III, there is a vast 
amount of work regarding the definition of rules for security 
policy enforcement. The proposed approach will apply the 
same steps to define and apply other rules for security 
policy enforcement, as it was shown for the PHP code 
example.  
Using the Jena framework, reasoning can be achieved by 
invoking the Jena inference engine. When the inference 
model is queried for data, statements that originally existed 
in the data set will be returned together with statements that 
were not in the original dataset. The new statements are 
inferred by the semantic reasoner using the defined rules or 
by other inference mechanisms. For example, when 
considering the information flow control code listings 
examples, one inferred statement could be “Assignment 3 is 
an information leak” and the representation in RDF follows. 
In this manner, a list of vulnerable code assignments is 
returned. 
 
@prefix fc: http://flowcontrol.org/  
<rdf:Description rdf:about=  
"fc:3#assignment">  
<rdf:type rdf:resource= 
"fc:InformationLeak "/>  
</rdf:Description> 
 
Code fragment 4. Assignment 3 is an information leak expressed using 
RDF. 
V. COMPARISON 
In this section, we provide a qualitative comparison of 
our proposed technique by comparing it with other popular 
methods of finding web vulnerabilities. For this purpose, we 
divide the existing approaches in 4 categories: taint mode, 
security-typed programming languages, security enforced in 
the database and our proposed approach. 
Our proposed approach offers several desirable features, 
including the language independent aspect and the machine 
learning capability. Although security enforced in the 
database can be considered programming language 
independent, it is highly infeasible that two or more web 
information systems written in different programming 
languages will have the same structure and access for and to 
the underlying database. 
TABLE I.  FEATURE COMPARISON BETWEEN SEVERAL DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
 
Proposed approach Taint mode Security-typed 
programming  
languages 
Security 
enforced in the 
database 
Language 
independent    
(with respect 
to the database) 
Machine learning 
capability     
Reusable/ 
Modular     
Effective N/A    
Multiple levels of 
security  (but possible) 
(with respect to 
the scripting 
language) 
  
No complex 
implementation     
No new scripting 
language     
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Due to the nature of web browsers and the HTTP 
protocol, web information systems are known to be highly 
insecure. “Hackers” target these systems in order to expose 
confidential information such as usernames and passwords 
leading to major losses in revenue and loss of users trust. 
While existing approaches that find web vulnerabilities are 
effective at discovering security pitfalls, they are language 
dependent. Thus, for different web information systems 
potentially different methods need to be applied, making 
existing methods not scalable. This paper describes an 
original technique that finds web vulnerabilities in web 
information systems and is independent of the programming 
language used and capable of machine learning using 
inference engines. 
Future work includes the implementation and the 
quantitative evaluation of the proposed technique. To 
evaluate we will use popular web information systems 
written in several different programming languages (e.g. 
PHP, Perl, Python and Java). We will use older versions of 
these systems with a list of security issues discovered in the 
past. The evaluation report will conclude that the proposed 
technique is effective at detecting vulnerabilities in web 
applications once all the known vulnerabilities are found. 
Yip, Wang, Zeldovich and Kaashoek [17] used this type of 
evaluation.  
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